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BY B. U. BURKE.
THOUGH aversion to secret diplomacy is very generally ex-
pressed in these days, public interest in the matter does not often
extend further than condemnation of the actual terms. Details and
examples of its processes are apt to be dismissed as dry, though they
can hardly be seen otherwise than as dynamic and dramatic when
the wide extent of their influence and their far reaching consequences
are taken into account, and accurate knowledge of them is essential
to thorough comprehension of public problems. The case of Morocco
exemplifies perhaps better than any other the devious ways of govern-
ments when left to their own devices, and continues to be of interest
not only as having been one of the deepest roots of the war, but be-
cause its ramifications are not necessarily ended.
The following short summary of the case is drawn in substance
from the books, pamphlets, and speeches of Mr. E. D. Morel, who
made a most exhaustive study of it and exposed it fully in 1912 with
the hope of averting war. The honesty of this purpose was generally
acknowledged at the time, even by those who diflfered with his de-
ductions, and his presentation of the facts has never been adeqvtately
refuted, however much interpretations of them may vary.
Important to an understanding of the whole problem is a pre-
liminary realization of the fact that remote as Morocco seems it was
a matter of direct interest to most of the great European Powers.
To Great Britain, as containing a point of strategical importance
opposite Gibralter : to Erance, as adjacent to her colonial interests
in northern Africa ; and to Germany for the markets it ofifered to
her increasing trade. To Spain, the fate of so close a neighbor could
not be a matter of indifference : and Italy, as a Mediterranean Power,
shared this interest to a lesser degree.
The first international convention on the subject of Morocco
was held at Madrid in 1880. Up to that time only France and Great
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Britain had enjoyed "most favoured nation" treatment in Morocco,
but at the suggestion of Germany, supported by Great Britain, this
was then extended to all nations. In the succeeding decade German
trade increased considerably in Morocco, so that in 1890 a commer-
cial treaty for five years was signed between Germany and Morocco,
it having been previously submitted for approval to the other sig-
natory Powers of the Madrid Convention. During the same period
the imperialistic party gained ascendency in France, and being am-
bitious of eventually gaining complete control of northern Africa,
they opposed Lord Salisbury's scheme for a commercial treaty be-
tween Great Britain and Morocco, mooted in 1891, though it was
approved by the German and Italian Ministers as seeking no purely
selfish interests.
From 1894 to 1901 friction continually increased between France
and Morocco on the Moorish-Algerian frontier, aggravated by French
annexation of several debatable border towns. At the same time
throughout these years M. Delcasse gave repeated assurances to the
Sultan of Morocco that his government intended to respect the in-
tegrity of Morocco. In 1901 M. Delcasse concluded an agreement
with Italy in which he undertook to allow Italy a free hand in Tripoli,
on condition that Italy would not interfere wnth French claims in
Morocco. At the same time he commenced secret negotiations with
Spain whereby France and Spain were to divide Morocco between
them. This treaty assumed final shape in September 1902. but in the
meantime Great Britain had got wind of the scheme and prevailed
upon Spain at the last minute not to agree to it, though her influence
in this was not revealed until November 1911.
In March 1904 W. Delcasse assured the German ambassador
at Paris that France desired to "uphold the existing political and
territorial status of Morocco." In April 1904 an agreement was
drawn up between France and Great Britain, and in October of the
same yc^ar a declaration was made public between France and vSpain.
In the Franco-British agreement France undertook not to interfere
with British ])lans in Fgypt, and Great Britain agreed to recognize
France's special interests in Alorocco. So- much was published to
the world at large. In the Franco-Spanish declaration both countries
announced that they were firmly attached to the integrity and in-
dependence of Morocco. Now subjoined to both these transactions
there were secret agreements whereby France and Spain agreed to
divide Morocco between them and to share the economic spoils;
Great P)ritain consenting, with the stipulation that Spain should
control llic coast line of the Mediterranean.
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These secret agreements were drawn up by the Foreign Offices
of the governments concerned and were kept secret from the parHa-
ments as well as the people of Great Britain. France and Spain, as
also from the governments and people of other countries for seven
years, for the world only came to know their contents in November
1911. (To quote Mr. Morel exactly: "No more unpardonable be-
trayal of the public interest, no more indefensible perversion of the
public mind has taken place in our generation, and in the French
parliament at least, the action of British and French diplomats has
been stigmatized as it deserved to be." This he illustrates in Ten
Years of Secret Diplomacy by extracts from speeches of Baron
d'Estournelles de Constant, M. Ribot and M. de Lamarzelle. The
matter was never broached in the British parliment.) The fact that
there were secret clauses which would not be revealed was made
public in the French press at the time, and confirmed by the leader
of the French Colonial party, M. Etienne. (Germany grew suspicious.
In March 1905. the Kaiser, acting on Prince Bulow's advice,
visited Tangier, where he informed the Sultan's representative that
he regarded the Sultan as an independent sovereign and that he was
determined to safeguard Germany's interests in Morocco. Simul-
taneously the German Government pressed the Sultan to demand
a second international conference, urging that the future of his
country was a matter which concerned all the great powers. This
proposal M. Delcasse naturally opposed, since he had taken the whole
direction of French foreign policy on his own shoulders and had not
even taken all the cabinet into his confidence. As the French
premier, M. Rouvier, and the rest of M. Delcasse colleagues finally
approved it however, he was forced to resign. Meanwhile the
British Foreign Office also opposed a fresh conference and the
Times adopted a most hostile attitude to Germany for having made
the proposal. The British public were of course ignorant of the
secret agreements and the German government had had reason to
be suspicious of their existence for some time, so that by the end of
1905 when a conference had at length been reluctantly consented
to, Angle-German relations were badly strained and the Entente
Cordiale had grown correspondingly stronger.
The Conference of Algeciras took place in February 1906,
Representatives of all the powers, including the United States, were
present, and an act was drawn up and signed by Great Britain,
France, Spain and Germany, the countries with chief interests in
Morocco. It was drawn up "in the name of God Almighty" and
based upon "the threefold principle of the sovereignty and inde-
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pendence of his Majesty the Sultan, the integrity of his dominions,
and economic hberty without any inequahty." This was the crucial
point in subsequent international relations. Had a new page reallv
been turned and a frank open policy followed, the British-Franco-
German atmosphere might halve cleared and the great war—already
looming so threateningly on the horizon—might possibly have been
averted.
Instead of this, from 1907 on, the French Government, ignoring
the Act of Algeciras, proceeded under one pretext or another to
absorb Morocco, encouraged by the British Foreign Office and the
officially inspired section of the British press. In the course of the
absorption many thousands of Moors were killed, and while the
French gradually took up permanent military occupation of more
and more towns and districts, the French Chamber was continuously
reiterating that it had no intention of interfering with the internal
afifairs of Morocco.
Early in 1909 discussions began between France and Germany
over Morocco, in which Germany sought compensation elsewhere in
Africa for the shelving of her Moroccan interests, and these dis-
cussions were intermittently kept up vmtil the spring of 1911, being
alternately taken up and dropped according to the changes in the
French Ministry. Owing to her continually increasing population
and relatively small colonial possessions, economic outlets and op-
portunities for obtaining raw material were increasingly necessary
to German industrial expansion.
In the meantime the disintegrating fungus of high finance, which
always accompanies Colonial ventures, was doing its deadly work.
The Sultan Mulai Hafid and his predecessor Abdulaziz had been
encouraged and even pressed to draw loan after loan upon Europe,
so that in 1910 Moroccan indebtedness amounted to £6.520,000.
In order to meet the interest on this sum Mulai Hafid had finally
become compelled to mortgage the Customs duties and all his other
Moorish sources of revenue, and he tried as well to raise extra
revenue from his subjects by all manner of cruel extortions. This
naturally led to internal unrest, and the French administration made
this a pretext for sending, in Mav 1911, a military expedition to
Fez to restore order, which was to be recalled when that object was
accomplished. Sir Edward Grey publicly approved of this proceed-
ing.
l)Ut the French troops remained in occupation, and Spain, deter-
mined not to lose the share that had been allotted to her in the secret
agreements of 1904, also sent troops to take possession of the
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Moroccan coast. Thereupon the Franco-German negotiations were
broken off and the German Government despatched a gunboat, the
Panther, to Agadir, to indicate more forcibly than by discussion that
they also had an interest in the fate of Morocco. This act was
promptly denounced in England as a violation of the Act of Alge-
ciras, and as almost a casus belli. The British press comments on
the subject were indeed more violent than the French ones. France
looked upon the sending of the Panther less as a hostile act and
more as an intimation that Germany intended seriously to dispute the
annexation of Morocco, and as a sign that the long continued nego-
tiations between the two countries must be finally concluded. It
subsequently transpired that in the negotiations previous to the
march on Fez. Germany had agreed to consent to a French Pro-
tectorate in Morocco given suitable compensation elsewhere, and the
sending of the Panther was therefore a public protest at an act at
which she had already privily connived. Foreseeing the settlement
this action must lead to. Sir Edward Grey insisted that Great Britain
must take part in any Franco-German discussions.
The case in brief was this : reciprocity of trade having been
guaranteed at two international conferences, at both of which Ger-
many was one of the signatory Powers, the German Government
felt that they were not justified in submitting to the alteration of the
status quo in Morocco without either their consent or the receipt oi
some compensation, where such a change so materially affected their
economic interests. They virtually said to France : You have
treated with Italy, then with Spain, and subsequently with Great
Britain, donating to all these Powers something in exchange for
their consent to your setting aside publicly ratified treaties as to
Morocco. Plow will you treat with us?
In answer to enquiries from the French Ambassador in July
1911, the German Foreign Secretary proposed that France should
turn over to Germany rather more than half the French Congo, and
offered in part exchange two of the German colonies in Africa,
Togoland and part of the Cameroons. This conversation was not
made public until December of that year, but in the meantime the
British press published many heated articles to the effect that Ger-
many was demanding impossible compensation from France and that
her real object was to gain possession of Agadir, which in turn was
represented as affecting British interests. Though Sir Edward Grev
afterwards admitted that France had kept him an courant with what
really transpired, this version was not contradicted, the affair of the
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Panther was exaggerated, and finally such a feeling of hostility to
Germany was aroused in the public mind that war seemed imminent.
At the height of this wave of public sentiment Mr. Lloyd
George made his famous Mansion House speech, in which he said:
"I would make great sacrifices to preserve peace. . .But if a situation
were forced upon us in which peace could only be preserved by the
surrender of the great and beneficient position Britain has won by
centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing Britain to be
treated where her interests were vitally affected as if she were of
no account in the cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically that
peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great
country like ours to endure." At the time this speech was made
about 80,000 French troops were in occupation of Morocco and had
taken possession of its capital, while Spanish troops occupied a large
portion of the coast. The Act of Algeciras had become a farce.
Meanwhile France, on whose behalf England was working
herself up to fever pitch, was comparatively calm about these Ger-
man proposals and only seeking to arrive at the best solution of
them. The attitude of the German public was that it was a matter
between themselves and France, and that no British interests were
endangered or involved in any way. Which indeed was so, except
for the major interest Great Britain felt she had in preventing any
Franco-German reapprochement, from fear of its upsetting the
balance of power. At length a treaty was signed between France
and Germany on November 4, 1911. Germany agreed to formally
recognize a French Protectorate over Morocco on condition that the
"open door," was to be assured to the commercial and industrial
enterprises of all nations, and in return received territorial com-
pensation in tropical Africa.
In November of that year the Paris press published the secret
agreements arrived at seven years previously between France, Great
Britain, and Spain, and about the same time disclosures were made
in England by Captain Faber M. P.. Lord Charles Beresford,
Admiral Freemantle and others as to the plans of the British Govern-
ment for giving military and naval aid to France in the event of war.
The truth of these latter statements was denied at the time, though
they were subse(|uently proved correct by Sir Edward Grey's dis-
closure of the understanding with France in his speech of August
3, 1914. .\11 these revelations strengthened the hands of the Im-
perialistic party in Germany, and the German people became con-
vinced that their Government had dealt weakly in the matter of
Morocco and had lowered German prestige in consenting to be
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ignored on a matter affecting all the great powers. War indeed was
only staved ofT in that stormy year of 1911 by the joint efforts of the
pacifically inclined parties in all the countries concerned.
But although war was then averted, the international atmosphere
had become, and was to remain, thoroughly poisoned by jealousy and
suspicion, and friction was intensified to an alarming degree by the
steady increase of armaments each power felt it necessary to make.
So that, as Mr. Morel says in his preface to Ten Years of Secret
Diplomacy : "The Moroccan quarrel will, by future generations
of English-speaking people, be regarded as one of those episodes
which leave indelible traces upon its destinies, forging links of
inter-connected circumstances afifecting a remote posterity." In
such a condensation as this the threads left out are necessarily many,
but the more fully the case is viewed, the more of an object lesson
it becomes as to what the peoples of the world have to expect if they
continue to leave the conduct of foreign affairs exclusively to
Foreign Offices and Chancelleries, and submit to being left in the
dark about matters so closely and vitally affecting their own interests.
